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Abstract
Symbolic execution is a classical program analysis technique used to show that programs satisfy or violate
given specifications. In this work we generalize symbolic execution to support program analysis for relational
specifications in the form of relational properties - these are properties about two runs of two programs on
related inputs, or about two executions of a single program on related inputs. Relational properties are
useful to formalize notions in security and privacy, and to reason about program optimizations. We design a
relational symbolic execution engine, named RelSym which supports interactive refutation, as well as proving
of relational properties for programs written in a language with arrays and for-like loops.
1 Introduction
Relational properties capture the relations between the behavior of two programs when run on two inputs, and
as a special case the behavior of one program on two different inputs. Several safety and security properties can
be described as relational properties: non-interference Goguen and Meseguer (1982), Goguen and Meseguer
(1984), compiler optimizations Benton (2004), sensitivity and continuity analysis Chaudhuri et al. (2010, 2012);
Reed and Pierce (2010), and relative cost C¸ic¸ek et al. (2017) are just some examples.
In order to prove a relational property, one must ensure that all the pairs of related executions satisfy
it, instead of just single executions. Similarly, for finding violations to relational properties, we need to find
pairs of related executions that violate the property. A natural way to approach the verification and the
testing of relational properties is through their reduction to standard (unary) properties through ideas like
self-composition Barthe et al. (2004); Terauchi and Aiken (2005); Butler and Schulte (2011) and product pro-
grams Barthe et al. (2011); Eilers et al. (2018). This approach permits to use standard program verification
and bug-finding techniques Milushev et al. (2012); Hritcu et al. (2013), and to reduce the problem to designing
convenient and efficient self-compositions and product programs.
Another way to approach the verification and testing of relational properties is through relational exten-
sions of standard, non-relational, techniques for these tasks. Several works have explored this approach for
techniques such as type systems Barthe et al. (2014b); Pottier and Simonet (2003); Nanevski et al. (2013);
Barthe et al. (2015), program logics Benton (2004); Barthe et al. (2012); Sousa and Dillig (2016), program anal-
ysis Kwon et al. (2017), and abstract interpretation Giacobazzi and Mastroeni (2004); Feret (2001); Assaf et al.
(2017). In this approach, one often aims at giving the user the choice on how to explore the use of the relational
assumptions, (i.e., relational preconditions, relational intermediate assumptions, and relational invariants) and
a way to relate two programs in order to prove relational properties. Relational assumptions have a different
flavor than non-relational ones, since they permit to consider only a subset of the product-relation between
inputs, and so only a subset of the pairs of execution of a program. These are often the key ingredients for
reasoning in a natural way about relational properties. In this paper, we follow this approach and we propose
relational symbolic execution (RelSym): a foundational technique combining the idea of relational analysis of
programs and symbolic execution.
RelSym is a relational symbolic execution engine for a language with arrays and for-loops. The target
applications we have in mind are data analysis and statistics, so we focused on a core calculus which constitute
the basis of languages like R R Core Team (2013). In fact, the design of RelSym was at an early stage informed
by the work in Morandat et al. (2012), on the subset of that language: Core R. For-loops and arrays provide
interesting challenges to both the design of the operational semantics and to the representation of the different
execution paths in constraints.
RelSym combines both proving and interactive refutation of relational properties, with the option of providing
loop invariants to effectively prove or refute properties of programs containing loops. RelSym is built on a
hierarchy of four languages (two relational and two unary — two concrete and two symbolic) whose operational
semantics are built on each other in a well-founded manner. In particular, the two relational languages are
based on their unary versions and the two symbolic languages are, as it usually happens in symbolic execution,
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the symbolic versions (i.e., extended with symbolic values) of the concrete ones. The symbolic operational
semantics collect constraints about the execution of a program, or about pairs of executions of programs, that
can be used to prove or refute relational properties. This gives the user the ability to experiment with different
ways of proving and interactively refuting relational properties, e.g., both using a single symbolic relational
execution or using a pair of unary symbolic executions.
We implemented RelSym as a prototype, and we used it for experimenting with different examples of inter-
active refutation and verification for several relational properties coming from different domains. The range of
properties and examples we considered show the flexibility and the feasibility of our approach.
We also compare RelSym with other non-relational methods such as self-composition and product programs
(which can also be defined using our tool) in their basic form with no optimization. We find that our approach,
thanks to the use of relational assumptions, improves in efficiency with respect to self-composition. Product
programs give verification conditions that are often comparable to the one obtained using relational methods,
and they can use standard symbolic execution tools, but a challenge in using this technique is the additional
cost, in term of design, in building the product—even if recent developments considerably eased this task,
e.g., Eilers et al. (2018). In relational symbolic execution, we do not need any pre-processing and we can
directly analyze a program in a relational way. This shows a trade-off between the different techniques which
can be exploited accordingly to the concrete target application. At the current stage, RelSym users need
to provide invariants for loops with symbolic guards. We envision for the future to combine our approach
with invariant synthesis techniques, especially relational ones, e.g., Qin et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2011, 2017);
Sigurbjarnarson et al. (2018).
Summarizing, the main contributions of our work are:
• The design of a relational symbolic execution technique, RelSym, for a language containing for-loops and
arrays. This technique is based on relational and unary symbolic operational semantics that permits to
explore the different execution paths of programs, maintaining constraints about pairs of executions that
can be used to prove or refute relational properties.
• The extension of relational symbolic execution to support relational and unary invariants to completely
explore a loop with symbolic guards.
• We have implemented RelSym in a prototype. The implementation uses an SMT solver to discharge
the generated constraints. We show the effectiveness of our approach by analyzing several examples for
different relational properties.
Outline The paper is structured in the following way: in Section 2 we introduce the different design choices
behind RelSym in an informal way. Using four running examples Section 3 shows at an high level how RelSym
works and how relational assumptions help in cutting the search space for proofs and refutation witnesses. In
Section 4, 5, and 6 we provide the main technical material describing the four languages behind RelSym and the
meta theoretical results that connect them. Section 7 provides some details about the RelSym implementation.
In Section 8 we provide an experimental comparison of the relational symbolic approach with other standard
techniques for the verification and bug finding of relational properties such as self-composition and product
programs. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss related works and in Section 10 we conclude by providing a summary
of this work.
2 Relational symbolic execution: informally
In this section, we will give an high-level introduction to the main characteristics of RelSym.
Relational semantics RelSym is based on a relational operational semantics, which describes the execution
of two, potentially different, programs in two, potentially different, memories. In this semantics a memory e.g.,
M can map a variable e.g., x, either to a single value, for instanceM(x) = 4, or to a pair of values, for instance
M(x) = (3, 4). In the first case, we know that in the two executions x will take the same value 4. In the second
case, x will take two different values in the two executions that is 3 and 4. In assertions, when we refer to one of
the two executions of the program we use indexed objects. For instance by writing x1 we mean the variable x
interpreted in the first (left) execution. When we instead have a precondition that implies that the variable has
the same value in both run we will just avoid indexes and write, for example, just x. The relational character
of memories is extended also to the operational semantics of commands and expressions thanks to a pairing
construct 〈· | ·〉. In the spirit of Pottier and Simonet (2003), with 〈c1 | c2〉 we denote a pair of commands that
might differ in two runs. These are needed, for instance, when the guard e, of a conditional if e then c1 else c2,
evaluates to different values in the two executions, and so the two executions need to take different branches.
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For instance, when evaluating if e then c1 else c2, if e evaluates to 〈1 | 0〉, the first execution needs to evaluate
c1, while the second one needs to evaluate c2. This situation is resolved by using the command pair 〈c1 | c2〉. To
relationally execute a paired command 〈c1 | c2〉 we execute both c1 and c2 in a unary fashion on two different
memories independently and when they both terminate we merge the two final unary memories in one final
relational memory.
Symbolic semantics To enable symbolic execution, the RelSym engine also supports symbolic valuesX,Y . . .
As in standard symbolic execution, a symbolic value X represents a set of possible concrete values. However,
in relational symbolic execution, symbolic values can appear also in pairs 〈X |Y 〉. During the computation,
symbolic values are refined through constraints coming from pre and postconditions, invariants, and conditionals
. At each step, the constraints describe all the possible concrete values that symbolic values, and pairs of symbolic
values, can assume. As a simple example, consider symbolic execution of the program if x = 0 then c1 else c2
starting with a memoryM whereM(x) = X . Note that the symbolic value X represents an arbitrary concrete
value, but the value is the same for both executions. Symbolic execution of the program would follow both
the first branch (collecting the constraint X = 0) and the second branch (collecting the constraint X 6= 0).
The two constraints restrict the set of concrete values that X can represent in the two branches, respectively.
Consider instead executing the same program but with an initial memory where M(x) = 〈X1 |X2〉. Here, the
two executions map the variable x to different symbolic values, meaning that the value of variable x may differ
in the two executions. Symbolic execution of the conditional would generate four possible configurations, based
on all possible combinations of the left and right executions taking the true and false branches. Using relational
assumptions, we can cut the space of the branches to explore and still get an analysis relational in nature that
allows us to exploit the naturality of this approach instead of reducing it to a unary approach.
Relational ghost variables We will make use of (relational) ghost variables Hofmann and Pavlova (2008)
to annotate programs or to give specifications for them. Ghost variables are variables that don’t correspond to
real program entities but appear only in the specification of a program. For instance when we will reason about
relational cost we will use a relational variable γ which counts the cost of the two runs. Other ghost variables
can be used to reason about other properties for instance covert channels or trace equivalence. The operational
semantics of the languages does not cover ghost variables by itself, but it can easily be extended by adding
conditions to the rule describing how they evolve during the computation. For instance when reasoning about
cost we can select a (potentially proper) subset of rules of the semantics which cover the cost model we have in
mind, and extend them with conditions describing how γ evolves. For simplicity in Section 3 we will measure
the cost of a program by the number of assignments it performs.
Proving relational specifications Throughout the whole paper we will use (relational) Hoare triples to
denote specifications of programs. That is, we will say that a program satisfies (or doesn’t) the triple {Φ}c{Ψ}.
Symbolic execution can be used to prove valid specifications. In general, if starting from a symbolic initial state
that satisfies a precondition Φ we execute (relationally and) symbolically a program c and we only reach final
states where the path constraints imply the postcondition Ψ we know that the triple {Φ}c{Ψ} is valid.
Interactive refutation and counterexample generation The dual way of reasoning is what symbolic
execution is mostly used for. Symbolic execution searches for final states whose associated path constraints
don’t imply the postcondition desired, if they are found it means that there is at least one state where the
desired postcondition might not hold. Symbolic execution has been proved useful to generate concrete test
cases that demonstrate violation of specifications. This is usually done by using constraint solvers to find
substitutions for symbolic values that satisfy at the same time the negation of the postcondition on the final
states (the violation of the specification) and some path condition (i.e., constraints over symbolic values based
on the control flow of the symbolic execution) guaranteeing the reachability of the violation. RelSym can be
used in the same way to find violations of relational properties.
Loops Traditionally, symbolic execution has been used more for bug finding and testing King (1976); Khurshid et al.
(2003) than for proving. One of the reasons for this is that conditionals and loops may create state explosion,
and long (possibly infinite) traces of configurations. To improve this situation we extend relational symbolic
execution with loop invariants Hentschel et al. (2014) so that the symbolic execution of a loop can be performed
by jumping over the loop in one step and by adding an invariant to the path condition. We design two rules
for unary and relational invariants which allow one to reason in one step about loops both for proving and
for finding counterexamples. We will see in Section 3 that using an invariant allows us to reason about arrays
with symbolic length, proving in this way this program satisfies a relational property (Lipschitz continuity) for
arrays of arbitrary length. When searching for counterexamples, the situation is a bit more delicate. Indeed,
just providing an inductive invariant may lead to unrealizable counterexamples: satisfiable substitutions that
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are not produced by any concrete execution. This can happen when the invariants do not determine precisely
enough the state that can be reached after the loop. To avoid this situation in subsection 6.3 we formalize a
notion of strength of an invariant. RelSym uses this notion to check whether the invariant provided is strong
enough ensuring that if a counterexample is found, then indeed it corresponds to a concrete execution (or a
pair of concrete executions) violating the (possibly relational) specification of the program. Using loop with
invariants mitigates in part the state explosion problem but it does not solve it entirely. A lot of research has
focused and still focuses on taming the state explosion in traditional symbolic execution. These techniques can
also be used for relational symbolic execution in order to tame this complexity. Since RelSym is intended as a
foundational work we won’t concern ourselves here with integrating the framework with standard techniques
for reducing space explosion, or loop invariant synthesization, as our goal is to present a different approach to
the verification and interactive refutation of relational properties.
Comparison with self-composition and product programs We already discussed how self-composition
and product programs are standard approaches which reduce relational properties to unary properties, and
which allow one to use standard program verification and bug-finding techniques. At the design level, we do not
propose our approach in contrast with these techniques but as an alternative. Indeed, one can use RelSym also
as a standard symbolic execution engine and use these techniques as a pre-processing phase transforming the
program in its self-composition or product program. However, we believe that at the technical level, relational
symbolic execution offers, in several situations, some keys advantages that permit to maximize the relational
reasoning. Indeed in the next section we will see that we don’t need to reason about the functional correctness of
the programs, to prove or disprove (even though to effectively find counterexamples strong invariants involving a
functional description might be needed) relational properties. This property is very useful in relational reasoning
since it does allow one to reduce the complexity of the constraints that one need to consider. Self-composition
cannot directly support this for example for arrays with symbolic length, while product programs can support
it but it requires more complex invariants than in the case of relational symbolic execution. To understand
better this kind of trade-offs we perform an experimental evaluation comparing RelSym with self-composition
and product programs in Section 8.
3 Examples
In this section we present a few examples for proving and disproving relational properties of programs. We will
hide many details in order to not distract the reader from the main point of the section which is to provide a
general understanding of the way RelSym works. For example, in the following we use assertions and constraints
interchangeably but later on (i.e., Section 4 and 5) the will be treated differently.
Proving anti-monotonicity of the inverse of cumulative distribution function (c.d.f) - concrete
bounds As a first motivating example we consider the program in Figure 1. The program takes in input a
real number q ∈ [0, 1] and an array d of size k ≥ 1 such that ∀i.1 ≤ i ≤ k.d[i] = P [X ≤ i], where X is some
unspecified random variable. That is, d represents the c.d.f of a random variable X whose realizations lie in
the set {1, . . . , k}. The program then proceeds to compute the smallest x such that P [X ≤ x] ≥ q. If we
consider d as its input and x as its output then the program implements the function F−1q , i.e., the inverse
c.d.f function. It is natural to consider the point wise order on c.d.fs described in Figure 1. The function F−1q
then, obeys the following relational property: ∀d1, d2, q.d1 cdf d2 =⇒ F−1q (d1) ≥ F
−1
q (d2). This property
should hence be true for the program considered. Let’s see how to see this using RelSym. RelSym will start
executing the program in a relational memory with two arrays d1 and d2 with the same length, say 5 for
instance. Every value in the arrays will be symbolic. These arrays will be related by the following relational
assumption (the precondition) Φ ≡ ∀i.1 ≤ i ≤ 5. =⇒ d1[i] ≤ d2[i]. What we want to show is that in every
final state x1 ≥ x2. At the i-th iteration (when xh = 0, for h ∈ {1, 2}) the constraint set will have the following
constraints cumh = dh[1] + · · ·+ dh[i − 1]
1. RelSym has now four possible paths to explore given by the outer
if-then-else, and for three of these there are four others given by the inner one, for a total of 13. Instead
of following a brute force approach and continuing exploring all the paths we can see that one of the paths is
already unsatisfiable. This because Φ implies cum2 ≥ cum1 and hence the path characterized by the constraint
cum1 ≥ q∧cum2 < q is not satisfiable, and hence not reachable, so it can safely be pruned at every i-th iteration.
This pruning was possible thanks to the relational assumption Φ. Similarly, at every i-th iteration, from the
symbolic state characterized by cum1 ≥ q ∧ cum2 ≥ q we can disregard the path with constraints x1 > 0 and
x2 ≤ 0. Relational reasoning allowed us to reduce the number of paths to follow at every iteration form 13 to 8.
It is easy to see how, following the remaining paths, RelSym only reaches final states where x1 ≥ x2 and hence
proves the specification.
1Actually it will contain the translation of this assertion in a constraint, but this is a technical detail.
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1) cum←0;
2) x←0;
3) for(i in 1 : len(cdf)) do
4) if(cum ≥ q) then
5) if(x ≤ 0) then
6) x←i
7) else
8) cum←cum+ cdf [i]
Figure 1: Let CDF the set of c.d.fs. The program implements F−1q : CDF → R. F
−1
q is monotonically
decreasing where the ordercdf on CDF, encoded in finite arrays, is defined as: d1 cdf d2 ⇐⇒ ∀x.d1[x] ≤ d2[x]
and we consider the standard order on R.
Proving k-Lipschitz continuity of sorting - symbolic bounds In the second running example - code
in Figure 2 - we will again prove a relational property of a program acting on arrays. The difference with the
previous example is that we will do it for array of symbolic (arbitrary) size n. To achieve that we will use a very
natural relational invariant. In general given a sorting algorithm, run on two arrays a1, a2 of integers with the
1) for(i in 1 : len(a)− 1) do
2) for(j in i+ 1 : len(a)) do
3) if(a[i] > a[j]) then
4) z←a[i]
5) a[i]←a[j]
6) a[j]←z
Figure 2: k-Lipschitz continuity of a sorting algorithm.
same length n and related by the following relational precondition Φ ≡ ∀t.1 ≤ t ≤ n =⇒ |a1[t]− a2[t]| ≤ k, we
expect the sorted arrays to still satisfy the same condition. We can see this property as k-Lipschitz continuity
of a sorting algorithm with respect to ℓ−infinity norm in both the input and output space. In the program
under scrutiny at every iteration of the inner loop we select the smallest element a[j] in the sub array [i+1 . . . n]
and we swap it, if necessary, with a[i]. In order to make sense of this example it’s important to understand
that the three lines 4), 5), and 6) which implement the swapping are actually continuous. Indeed, when RelSym
is executing the branching instruction, there are four possible ways the two executions can proceed, that is:
both take the same branch, or they get different branches. When the two executions take the same branch
then obviously Φ still holds. The following Observation 1 guarantees that this is the case also when the two
executions follow different branches.
Observation 1. ∀x, y, z, w, k.
|x− y| ≤ k, |z − w| ≤ k, x > z, y ≤ w =⇒ |z − y| ≤ k, |x− w| ≤ k.
For instance, instantiating x = a1[i], y = a2[i], z = a1[i+1], w = a2[i+1], ensures that Φ still holds when the
left execution takes the true branch and the right execution takes the false branch. So, omitting synchronization
of the loop variables, by using the invariant: I ≡ ∀t.1 ≤ t < i =⇒ |a1[t]− a2[t]| ≤ k for both the loops we can
jump outside of the external loop to a unique state where I[len(a) + 1/i] holds. This state implies trivially the
postcondition. The important fact to notice here is the very natural invariant that relational reasoning allows
us to specify. In a unary execution instead we would have to come up with non trivial invariants allowing us to
prove the functional correctness of the program. We will need to prove not only that the program produces a
sorted sequence but also that the output is a a
Refuting cost equivalence - concrete bounds In the next example we will use RelSym to refute a property
about a pair of programs c1, c2. Let’s consider the programs in Figure 3. As we mentioned, RelSym rules can
be extended to use ghost variables that can be updated at every step of execution of the abstract machine. We
can in this way reason about relational cost C¸ic¸ek et al. (2017), by using the relational ghost variable γ which
gets incremented at every assignment. Let’s see this in an example where the two programs take both in input
an array of non negative symbolic integers of size 5 for instance. The two programs would sum in the variable t
all their elements up to some value and save in the variable o the first index in the array that made t ≥ k true.
Obviously the first program has a higher cost in terms of assignments performed. We want to refute that the
two programs have the same cost, that is our postcondition to falsify is γ1 = γ2, while our precondition would be
∀i.1 ≤ i ≤ 5 =⇒ a1[i] = a2[i]. At every iteration of the body, for i ranging from 1 to 5, RelSym would perform,
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using a specific rule, one step on the left execution updating t and no steps in the right execution. So γ1 would
be incremented but γ2 would not. Now the two runs are both about to execute a branching instruction. If on
the left execution the guard is true we perform the assignment, and the same assignment is performed on the
right. Hence the difference in cost is preserved. If the guard on the left is false we loop, performing another
assignment, while on the second run we don’t. RelSym would explore these paths finding an initial state, that is
a set of concrete values for the array for which the execution of the two programs would lead to a final relational
state where γ1 > γ2. We stress here how RelSym can, with specific rules, relationally analyze programs with
different syntactical structures by looking for synchronization points, i.e., branching instructions, to maximise
relational reasoning.
1) t←0; o←0
2) for(i in 1 : len(a)) do
3) t←a[i] + t
4) if (t ≥ k ∧ o ≤ 0) then
5) o←i
6)
Version 1
t←0; o←0
for(i in 1 : len(a)) do
if (t ≥ k) then
if (o ≤ 0) then
o←i
else t←a[i] + t
Version 2
Figure 3: The two versions of the program are not cost equivalent.
Refuting non-interference - symbolic bounds with weak invariant The next running example involves
non-interferenceGoguen and Meseguer (1982). Non-interference was introduced as a strong confidentiality guar-
antee preventing information to flow from secret values to public observable values. Non-interference can be
formally stated as a relational property of two executions of a single program with different inputs: a program
c is non-interferent if given two input memories M1 and M2 that agree on public data and possibly differ on
confidential data, the execution of c onM1 and M2 results in memories M′1 and M
′
2
, respectively, that agree
on public data. That is, secret variables don’t interfere with observable public variables. Let’s consider the
program c in Figure (4). The program takes in input a secret vector of integers s and password vector of integers
p of the same length. It then scans the arrays and checks whether they are point wise equal. If not it saves in
o the index of the first difference. If we assume s to be an high level variable and p, o, t low level variables, this
program is obviously interferent. Starting from two memories where len(s) = len(p)∧p1 = p22 we can very well
reach a final state where o1 = o2 ∧ t1 = t2 does not hold. We can check this (i.e., refute non-interference) for ar-
bitrary length arrays of size n. In particular by using the relational invariant Iw ≡ (t1 = t2∧o1 = o2)⇔ s1 = s2.
Using RelSym with that invariant will allow to disprove the postcondition γ1 = γ2, but the initial memories that
1) t←0; o←0
2) for(i in 1 : len(s)) do
3) if(s[i] 6= p[i] ∧ o ≤ 0) then
4) o←1; t←i
Figure 4: Interferent program
RelSym would find might not correspond to real counterexamples this because the relational invariant was not
strong enough.
Counterexample generation for non-interference - symbolic bounds with strong invariant In the
above program we can get exact counterexamples by choosing the stronger relational invariant Is ≡ Iw ∧ t1 =
minh s1[h] 6= p1[h] ∧ t2 = minh s2[h] 6= p2[h] ∧ o1 ∈ {0, 1} ∧ o2 ∈ {0, 1}3. As we can see we need to specify the
functional (unary) behavior of the two programs in the relational invariant in order to strengthen it. RelSym
would then disprove the specification by providing a relational initial memory M for which the precondition
holds and a final relational memory M′ related by the operational semantics of the program. For instance:
M(p) = ([0], [0]),M(s) = ([0], [1]),M′(o) = (0, 1),M′(t) = (0, 1).
2Equality on arrays is point wise equality, and can be easily encoded in a first order logic formula with one universal quantifier.
3Again, this invariant is expressible in the language, but it can be expressed easily in the language of our assertions.
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for-unroll
〈M, e1〉 ⇓F v1 〈M, e2〉 ⇓F v2 v1 ≤ v2
(M, for (x in e1:e2) do c)
F−→
M, x←v1; c; if v2 − v1 thenfor (x in v1 + 1:v2) do c
else skip


Figure 5: A rule for loops in FOR
4 Concrete Languages: FOR, RFOR
As already mentioned RelSym is composed by four languages. That is, we extend the semantics of the simplest
language FOR in two different directions: relationally (RFOR), and symbolically (SFOR). And then we extend
them both to obtain RSFOR. In this section we describe the simplest language which is an imperative language
(FOR) that contains for-loops and computes over integers and arrays of integers, and then extend it to a
relational language (RFOR). We refer to these two languages as concrete to distinguish them from the symbolic
languages that we will build on top of them in Section 5.
4.1 FOR
Programs in FOR have the following grammar, where v ∈ Z are values:
e ::= e⊕ e | a[e] | len(a) | x | v
c ::= skip | c; c | x←e | a[e]←e | if e then c else c |
for (x in e:e) do c
A variable x ∈ Var denotes an integer while an array name a ∈ Arrvar denotes a function which maps the set
of natural numbers {1, ..., l} to the set Z, with l denoting the length of the array. The set of such functions is
denoted by Array. The symbol ⊕ denotes an arithmetic operation in {+,−, . . .}. Expressions are standardly
evaluated using a big step judgment 〈M, e〉 ⇓F v whose defining rules we omit. Programs c are evaluated
through a, mainly standard, small step judgment (M, c) F−→ (M′, c′), where memories M,M′ ∈ Mem are
partial functions with type (Var → Z) ∪ (Arrvar → Array). We only show one rule for for-loop construct
evaluation in Figure 5. Note that for-loops, and thus FOR programs, are always terminating.
4.2 Assertions, triples, validity
We state and validate program specifications using Hoare triples {Φ}c{Ψ}, where c is a command in FOR
and Φ and Ψ (respectively, the pre- and post-condition of the triple) are assertions. Assertions are first-order
logical formulas with primitive predicates that compare arithmetic expressions aexp. The latter are built from
expressions in FOR extended with integer-valued logical variables (i ∈ Lvar) and array expressions α. Array
expressions include array names a, and array update expressions α[aexp1 7→ aexp2], which denotes the array
α with the value at index aexp1 updated to aexp2. Array expressions allow us to express and reason about
updates on arrays using the the extensional theory of arrays McCarthy (1961). The truth of a unary assertion Φ
is evaluated against a memory M ∈Mem and a logical interpretation I ∈ Intlog ≡ ZLvar. We write M I Φ
to denote that Φ holds in memory M with interpretation I. The following definition, although standard, is
given because it will later be extended to a relational setting.
Definition 1. Let Φ and Ψ be unary assertions and c be a FOR command. We say that the triple {Φ}c{Ψ}
is valid, and we write  {Φ}c{Ψ}, if and only if ∀M1,M2 ∈ Mem, I ∈ Intlog, if M1 I Φ and (M1, c)
F−→
∗(M2, skip) then M2 I Ψ.
4.3 RFOR
To enable relational reasoning we first build a relational language RFOR on top of FOR. Intuitively, execu-
tion of a single RFOR program represents the execution of two FOR programs. Inspired by the approach of
Pottier and Simonet (2003), we extend the grammar of FOR with a pair constructor 〈· | ·〉 which can be used
at the level of values 〈v1 | v2〉, expressions 〈e1 | e2〉, or commands 〈c1 | c2〉. Notice that ci, ei, vi for i ∈ {1, 2}
are commands, expressions, and values in FOR, hence nested pairing is not allowed. This syntactic invariant
is preserved by the rules handling the branching instruction. Pair constructs are used to indicate where com-
mands, values, or expressions might be different in the two unary executions represented by a single RFOR
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r-if-false-false
〈M, e〉 ⇓RF 〈v1 | v2〉
v1 ≤ 0 v2 ≤ 0
(M, if e then ctt else cff ) RF−→ (M, cff )
r-if-false-true
〈M, e〉 ⇓RF 〈v1 | v2〉 v1 ≤ 0 v2 > 0
(M, if e then ctt else cff ) RF−→ (M, 〈⌊cff ⌋1 | ⌊ctt⌋2〉)
r-arr-ass-split
〈M, el〉 ⇓RF vl 〈M, eh〉 ⇓RF vh M(a) = f
⌊vl⌋1, ⌊vl⌋2 ∈ dom(f) ⌊vl⌋1 6= ⌊vl⌋2
f1 = f [⌊vl⌋1 7→ ⌊vh⌋1] f2 = f [⌊vl⌋2 7→ ⌊vh⌋2]
(M, a[el]←eh) RF−→ (M[a 7→ 〈f1 | f2〉], skip)
r-pair-step
{i, j} = {1, 2}
(⌊M⌋i, ci) F−→ (M
′
i, c
′
i)
c′j = cj M
′
j = ⌊M⌋j
M′ =merge(M′1,M
′
2)
(M, 〈c1 | c2〉) RF−→ (M
′, 〈c′
1
| c′
2
〉)
r-lift
〈⌊M⌋1, ⌊e⌋1〉 ⇓F v1
〈⌊M⌋2, ⌊e⌋2〉 ⇓F v2
v =
{
v1 if v1 = v2
(v1, v2) otherwise
〈M, e〉 ⇓RF v
Figure 6: Semantics of RFOR (selected rules).
execution. To define the semantics for RFOR, we first extend memories to allow program variables to map
to pairs of integers, and array variables to map to pairs of arrays. That is, the type of memories for RFOR
is (Var → Z ∪ Z2) ∪ (Arrvar → Array ∪ Array2). The semantics of RFOR is defined as a big step judg-
ment 〈M, e〉 ⇓RF v for expressions and a small step judgment (M, c) RF−→ (M′, c′) for commands, where M,M′
are relational memories, c, c′ are commands in RFOR, v ranges over Z ∪ Z2, and e is a relational expres-
sion. Figure 6 shows a selection of the inference rules for these judgments. The rules use auxiliary functions
⌊·⌋1 and ⌊·⌋2, which project, respectively, the first (left) and second (right) elements of a pair construct (i.e.,
⌊〈c1 | c2〉⌋i = ci, ⌊〈e1 | e2〉⌋i = ei with ⌊v⌋i = v when v ∈ Z), and are homomorphic for other constructs. For
a relational memory M, we write ⌊M⌋i for the (unary) memory that projects the co-domain appropriately:
∀n ∈ dom(M). ⌊M⌋i(n) = ⌊M(n)⌋i. Rule r-lift is the only evaluation rule for RFOR expressions. It evaluates
the left and right projections of the memory and expression, and combines the results into either a single value,
if both projections produce the same result, or a pair value otherwise. Rule r-if-false-false shows what happens
if the left and right executions both agree on taking the false branch: the command if e then ctt else cff steps
to command cff . However, if the left and right execution disagree on which branch to take, we need to introduce
a command pair construct to indicate that the command being executed differs in the left and right executions.
One instance of this is rule r-if-false-true. We ensure well-formedness of the paired commands by projecting
ctt and cff before pairing them up. Rule r-pair-step evaluates a pair command by picking one projection, non
nondeterministically, and evaluating it one step, using the semantics of FOR. The helper function merge(·, ·)
merges two FOR memories M1 and M2 into a RFOR memory, using as few pair values as possible:
merge(M1,M2) = λm.
{
M1(m) if M1(m) =M2(m)
(M1(m),M2(m)) otherwise
Another rule, not shown in the figure, reduces (M, 〈skip | skip〉) to (M, skip). The rules regarding array
assignments now have to take into account that arrays might differ in the two runs. In particular, given the
command a[el]←eh the two expressions el and eh might evaluate differently in the left and right projections.
In the case where M(a) is a unary array but the index expression evaluates to a pair value then the updated
array will be a pair of arrays, as shown in r-arr-ass-split.
4.4 Relational assertions, relational triples, and relational validity
We again use Hoare triples to provide specifications of RFOR programs. However, assertions for RFOR must
be able to express properties of both executions of a program, and the relationship between them. To achieve
this, we extend expressions in the language to include indexed program variables and array variables, that is
we equip an array name a or a program variable x with an index i ∈ {1, 2} so that, for example a1 denotes
the array a in the left execution, or x2 denotes the variable x in the right execution. We refer to the extended
language as relational assertions. We extend relational operators (=,≤, <, . . . ) and binary operators (+,−, . . . )
to work with two pairs of values in the obvious way, and adapt the definition of the truth of a relational assertion
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(M I Φ) appropriately. Note that logical variables continue to range only over integers (and not over pairs
of integers). Nonetheless, the logic allows us to express relational and unary properties easily. Validity of
relational Hoare triples for RFOR is similar to Definition 1, except for the use of relational assertions, relational
memories, and the semantic judgment of RFOR instead of FOR. In the same spirit of the consistency theorem in
Banerjee et al. (2016), the following lemma provides a semantical justification for RFOR with respect to FOR.
Lemma 1. Let Φ and Ψ be relational assertions and c be a FOR command. If  {Φ}c{Ψ} then for all unary
memories M1,M2,M′1,M
′
2 and for all I ∈ Intlog such that merge(M1,M2) I Φ, (M1, c)
F−→
∗
(M′1, skip)
and (M2, c) F−→
∗
(M′
2
, skip) then merge(M′
1
,M′
2
) I Ψ.
Notice that concrete relational semantics is incomplete with respect to the unary semantics with respect to
traces in the sense that the iterations of a loop go in lockstep until at least one side terminates (after which the
other side may continue). In fact, in order to keep the design of the language simple we only allow pair commands
to be introduced by a branching instruction. In general this causes RFOR to not be complete with respect to FOR.
So it is not possible to use invariants that hold between different iterations by using rule such as the dissonant
loop rule in Beringer (2011). Indeed in RelSym the following two programs cannot not be proved equivalent, for
arbitrary positive n: for (i in 1:2 ∗n) do x←x+ 1 and for (i in 1:n) do x←x+ 1; for (i in 1:n) do x←x+ 1.
5 Symbolic Languages: SFOR, RSFOR
Symbolic execution King (1976) extends a language with symbolic values that represent unknown or undeter-
mined concrete values. Symbolic execution uses symbolic values in logical formulas that track the conditions
under which a particular execution path is taken. By exploring different execution paths and finding satisfying
assignments to these logical formulas (i.e., finding concrete values to substitute for symbolic values such that
the formulas will be satisfied), symbolic execution of a program can be used to find concrete test cases that
demonstrate an assertion violation in a program. Conversely, if all execution paths of a program are explored
and no violation is found, then symbolic execution shows that a program is guaranteed to meet its specification.
In this section, we extend the FOR and RFOR languages with symbolic execution, giving us, respectively, the
languages SFOR and RSFOR. In particular, RSFOR allows us to reason symbolically about two executions of a
FOR program, and thus enables us to look for violations of relational assertions of FOR programs. However, we
need to define SFOR in order to fully specify the semantics of RSFOR, indeed, similarly to how the semantics
of RFOR relies on the semantics of FOR, the semantics of RSFOR relies on the semantics of SFOR.
The main insight of symbolic execution is to represent sets of concrete values (in this case integers) and
sets of concrete runs of a program with symbolic values drawn from a set Symval. Symbolic values can be
refined during the computation using constraints expressed as formulas in some formal theory. For instance,
when the guard X of an if construct is symbolic, we might choose to symbolically execute the true branch
and refine the set of possible concrete values that X denotes by adding the constraint X > 0 to the path
condition. The connection between symbolic languages and concrete languages is given by ground substitutions
σ ∈ Σ ≡ Symval → Z ∪Array. We say that a constraint φ is satisfiable if there exists a σ ∈ Σ that makes it
true. That is, if substituting all the symbolic values X appearing in φ with σ(X) gives us a true statement. If
that’s the case we write σ |= φ. When we are only interested in expressing the satisfiability of φ with no interest
in specifying the actual substitutions we will write SAT(φ). Given a set of constraints S, abusing notation,
we denote by S the constraint
∧
s∈S
s. Satisfiable path conditions denote actual concrete executions. That is,
all those concrete executions which assign to the symbolic values concrete values that make the path condition
true. If a path condition is unsatisfiable then it does not represent any concrete execution. A set of constraints
is valid if it is true under every possible substitution. We denote the validity of a constraint φ by |= φ. Building
on the previous section we can now define the two symbolic languages SFOR and RSFOR.
5.1 SFOR
We extend the syntax of FOR expressions by adding to its values elements X ∈ Symval, denoting symbolic
values. Now memories in SFOR map program variables to either integers or symbolic values. We also represent
symbolic arrays in memory as pairs (X, v), where v is a (concrete or symbolic) integer value representing the
length of the array, and X is a symbolic value representing the array contents, as in the standard theory of
arrays McCarthy (1961). The content of the arrays can be refined in a set of constraints described below.
Thus, memories in SFOR have the type (Var → Vs) ∪ (Arrvar → Arrays), where Vs ≡ Z ∪ Symval and
Arrays ≡ Symval × Vs. Configurations in SFOR are triples (M, c,S) where M is a memory, c is a SFOR
command, and S is a set of constraints. Constraints are first-order logical formulas with primitive predicates
that compare expressions (e) over concrete (n ∈ Z), symbolic values (X ∈ Symval) and logical variables
(i ∈ Lvar). Constraint expression select(e1, e2) represents the (integer) result of reading the array denoted by
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s-arr-read
〈M, e,S〉 ⇓SF 〈vs,S
′〉 M(a) = (X, v′s) Y fresh
〈M, a[e],S〉 ⇓SF 〈Y,S
′ ∪ {Y = select(X, vs), vs > 0, vs ≤ v
′
s}〉
s-arr-write
〈M, e1,S〉 ⇓se 〈v1,S
′〉 〈M, e2,S
′〉 ⇓se 〈v2,S
′′〉
M(a) = (X, vl) Y fresh M
′ =M[a 7→ (Y, l)]
S ′′′ ≡ S ′′ ∪ {Y = store(X, v1, v2), v1 > 0, v1 ≤ l}
(M, a[e1]←e2,S)
SF−→ (M′, skip,S ′′′)
s-if-true
〈M, e,S〉 ⇓SF 〈vs,S
′〉
(M, if e then ctt else cff ,S)
SF−→ 〈ctt ,S
′ ∪ {vs > 0}〉
s-for-inv
〈M, e1,S〉 ⇓SF 〈v1,S
′〉 〈M, e2,S
′〉 ⇓SF 〈v2,S
′′〉
e1, e2 ∈ aexp  {I ∧ e1 ≤ x ∧ x ≤ e2}cb{I[x+ 1/x]}
Mf = λn.


v2, if n = x
X, if n ∈ Upd(cb), n ∈ Var, X fresh
(X, l), if n ∈ Upd(cb),M(n) = (Z, l), X fresh
M(n) otherwise
|= S ′′ =⇒ JI[e1/x] ∧ e1 ≤ e2KM
Sf = S
′′ ∪ {JI[e2 + 1/x]KMf }
(M, for (x in e1:e2) doI cb,S)
SF−→ (Mf , skip,Sf )
Figure 7: Semantics of SFOR (selected rules).
e1 at the index denoted by e2, while store(e1, e2, e3) represents the (array) result of updating the array denoted
by e1 at index e2 with value e3. A set of constraints S is used to record restrictions on symbolic values that
must hold in order for program execution to reach a specific configuration.
Note that although both assertions and constraints are logical formulas that include comparisons of ex-
pressions, they differ because assertions may contain program variables and array names but may not contain
symbolic values; constraints on the other hand may contain symbolic values (including select(·, ·) and store(·, ·, ·)
expressions) and may not contain program variables or array variables. Given a memory M, we can translate
assertions to constraints, using M to replace program variables and array names with the (symbolic or con-
crete) values M maps them to. We write J·KM for this translation function defined inductively on the shape
of the expression. Symbolic values can now appear in expressions, so a for loop executed by unrolling might
not terminate. For this reason we extend the category of commands to also contain commands of this form:
for (x in e1:e2) doI c. Where I is an assertion intended to be a loop invariant. The two kinds (with and
without invariant) of for-loops are treated as distinct syntactic forms.
The semantics of SFOR is defined through a big-step judgment, 〈M, e,S〉 ⇓SF 〈v,S
′〉, for expressions, and a
small-step judgment (M, c,S) SF−→ (M′, c′,S ′) for commands. Figure 7 shows some selected rules defining the
judgments. Notice that evaluating an expression might generate new symbolic values, and this is why also ⇓SF
returns an updated set of constraints S ′. In rules for conditionals, like the rule s-if-true, we record in the
constraint set the information about the control flow path. Rules handling the conditionals make the small-step
operational semantics non-deterministic, since we have to consider both the case when the guard reduces to
a value greater than 0 and when it reduces to a value less or equal than 0. In rules for arrays, we record
in the constraint set the description of arrays. For example, the rule s-arr-read records the selection in the
constraint using a fresh symbol Y which has never occurred in the computation before that point. Rule s-arr-
write evaluates the index of the array to update and the right hand side of the assignment after updating the
memory it records the array update in the set of constraints. As already mentioned we allow the user to specify
invariant for loops and use the rule s-for-inv. This rule allows to skip in one step the whole unrolling of the
for-loop provided that the user has specified an actual inductive invariant. Specifically, the semantic judgment
 {I ∧ e1 ≤ x ∧ x ≤ e2}cb{I[x+ 1/x]} imposes that I holds before and after every iteration of the body of the
loop provided that the counter variable x is between the bounds. Checking that e1, e2 ∈ aexp makes sure that
the premise of the triple is actually an assertion and does not contain symbolic values, as it could be the case
since e1, e2 are expressions in SFOR. The additional check, |= S
′′ =⇒ JI[e1/x] ∧ e1 ≤ e2KM, imposes that the
constraints collected before executing the loop are strong enough to imply the invariant right before the start
of the loop. The configuration to which the for-loop with invariant steps to has a set of constraint Sf which
records the fact that the for-loop has terminated and so includes the constraint JI[e2 + 1/x]KMf . The final
memory Mf maps to fresh symbolic values all the variables, or array names which might have been updated
in the body cb (Upd(·) performs a syntactic check on cb, soundly approximating the set of variables updated
by cb). Notice that we don’t update the length of the arrays, because we consider only arrays of fixed (static
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or concrete) length. At the exit of the loop the counter variable has to map to the value to which the second
guard of the for-loop was reduced to.
5.2 RSFOR
Similarly to what we did in the previous section, we now extend the language RFOR to RSFOR using symbolic
values X . The symbolic extension of the relational language follows the same steps as the unary with the
difference that now symbolic values can also appear in pairs of expressions 〈e1 | e2〉 and pairs of commands
〈c1 | c2〉 and pairs of values in a memory (v1, v2). As in the case of the previous languages we give the semantics
to RSFOR by means of a big step semantics for symbolic relational expressions proving judgments of the shape
〈M, e,S〉 ⇓RSF 〈v,S ′〉, and a small step semantics for symbolic relational commands proving judgments of the
shape (M, c,S) RSF−−→ (M′, c′,S ′). We provide a selection of the rules to prove those judgments in Figure 8.
Projection functions need now to be smartly extended to relational assertions, this would be particularly useful
for example when a for-loop with invariant I appears in one of the branches of an if construct with a guard
which evaluates to a relational value 〈v1 | v2〉, since both cases v > 0, v ≤ 0 have to be considered. For this
reason we extend projection functions for basic relational assertions in the following way (where {p, q} = {a, b},
and where the function Idx(·) returns the set (potentially empty) of indices i ∈ {1, 2} appearing in a relational
expression):
⌊ea ⊗ eb⌋i = ⌊ea⌋i ⊗ ⌊eb⌋i if Idx(eq) ⊆ Idx(ep) = {i} or
Idx(eq) = Idx(ep) = ∅
⌊ea ⊗ eb⌋i = true otherwise
⌊xi⌋i = x
⌊x⌋i = x
For other forms of assertions projection functions behave homomorphically. So for i ∈ {1, 2} we can now define
⌊for (x in e1:e2) doI cb⌋i ≡ for (x in ⌊e1⌋i:⌊e2⌋i) do⌊I⌋i ⌊cb⌋i. Also, merge-s(·, ·) plays a similar role in the
relational symbolic semantics to what merge(·, ·) does in the concrete one. The rule r-s-lift relies on SFOR.
It evaluates a relational symbolic expression and returns a single symbolic value if the two unary symbolic
execution reduce to the same integer value, otherwise it splits. Rule r-s-arr-ass-split takes care of an array
assignment when the array is symbolic unary but the right hand side of the assignment is different, and hence
the array needs to be split. Rule r-s-if-false-true is similar to the analogous rule for the concrete semantics
we presented in Figure 6, the main difference is that now the path conditions are recorded in the constraint
set. Rule r-s-if-right takes care of a pair command with a branching instruction on the right and a different
command on the left. This rule, and a similar one for the left execution, helps synchronization of the two
runs. In rule r-s-pair-step takes care of the general case, where c1 ≡ c2 means structural equality, for instance
c1 and c2 are both assignments. Similarly to the analogous concrete rule, one side of the two is chosen non-
nondeterministically, and one step on that side is performed using the unary symbolic semantics. Finally, the
rule r-s-for-inv allows the user to specify a relational invariant for a for-loop which might diverge because
one of the guards evaluates to a value containing a symbolic value. The rule r-s-for-inv behaves similarly to
s-for-inv but in a relational setting.
5.3 Unary and relational collecting semantics
Building on the SF−→ and RF−→ semantics, we define now two collecting semantics which consider only reachable
configurations, namely those whose set of constraints is satisfiable. Overloading the symbol ⇒ we will denote
by it both the unary and relational collecting semantics. Both semantics are defined through only one rule
presented in Figure 9. In rule set-step we remove from the set of configurations taken in consideration the
current configuration and we add to it all the configurations reachable in one step that are satisfiable.
set-step
Ft = {(M
′, c′,S ′) | (M, c,S)
†
−→ (M′, c′,S ′) ∧ SAT(S ′)}
(M, c,S) ∈ F F ′ =
(
F \ {(M, c,S)}
)
∪Ft
F ⇒ F ′
Figure 9: Unary and relational collecting semantics rule schema.
† ∈ {SF, RSF}
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r-s-lift
〈⌊M⌋1, ⌊e⌋1,S〉 ⇓SF 〈v1,S
′〉 〈⌊M⌋2, ⌊e⌋2,S
′〉 ⇓SF 〈v2,S
′′〉
〈v,S ′′′〉 =
{
〈v1,S
′′〉 if (v1, v2) ∈ Z
2 ∧ v1 = v2
〈(v1, v2),S
′′〉 otherwise
〈M, e,S〉 ⇓RSF 〈v,S
′′′〉
r-s-arr-ass-split
M(a) = (X, l) ∈ Symval ×Vs Z fresh W fresh
〈M, ei,S〉 ⇓RSF 〈vi,S
′〉 〈M, eh,S
′〉 ⇓RSF 〈vh,S
′′〉
S ′′′ = S ′ ∪ {⌊vh⌋1 6= ⌊vh⌋2, Z = store(X, ⌊vi⌋1, ⌊vh⌋1)}
S ′′′′ = S ′′′ ∪ {W = store(X, ⌊vi⌋2, ⌊vh⌋2), 0 < ⌊vi⌋1 ≤ l, 0 < ⌊vi⌋2 ≤ l}
(M, a[ei]←eh,S) RSF−−→ (M[a 7→ ((Z, l), (W, l))], skip,S
′′′′)
r-s-if-false-true
〈M, e,S〉 ⇓RSF 〈v,S
′〉
S ′′ = S ′ ∪ {⌊v⌋1 ≤ 0, ⌊v⌋2 > 0}
(M, if e then ctt else cff ,S) RSF−−→ (M, 〈⌊cff ⌋1 | ⌊ctt⌋2〉,S
′′)
r-s-pair-step
(⌊M⌋i, ci,S)
SF−→ (M′i, c
′
i,S
′′)(
if · then · else · 6= cj = c
′
j or c1 ≡ c2
)
{1, 2} = {i, j} M′j = ⌊M⌋j M
′ =merge-s(M′1,M
′
2)
(M, 〈c1 | c2〉,S) RSF−−→ (M
′, 〈c′
1
| c′
2
〉,S ′′)
r-s-if-right
c1 ≡ if · then · else · c2 /∈ {if · then · else ·, skip}
(⌊M⌋2, c2,S) SF−→ (M
′
2
, c′
2
,S ′′) M′ =merge-s(⌊M⌋1,M
′
2
)
(M, 〈c1 | c2〉,S) RSF−−→ (M
′, 〈c1 | c
′
2
〉,S ′′)
r-s-for-inv
〈M, ea,S〉 ⇓RSF 〈va,S
′〉 〈M, eb,S
′〉 ⇓RSF 〈vb,S
′′〉
 {I ∧ ea ≤ x ∧ x ≤ eb}c{I[x1 + 1/x1][x2 + 1/x2]}
|= S ′′ ⇒ JI[⌊ea⌋1/x1][⌊ea⌋2/x2] ∧ ea ≤ ebKM
Sf = S
′′ ∪ {JI[⌊vb⌋1 + 1/x1][⌊vb⌋2 + 1/x2]KMf }
Mf = λn.


vb, if n = x
(X,Y ), if n ∈ Updr(c),M(n) ∈ Vs ∪Vs
2
X fresh, Y fresh
((X, l), (Y, l)), if n ∈ Updr(c),M(n) ∈ Array
s
π2(M(n)) = l
((X, l), (Y, l)), if n ∈ Updr(c),M(n) ∈ Arrays
2
π2(π2(M(n))) = l
M(n), otherwise
(M, for (x in ea:eb) doI c,S)
RSF−−→ (Mf , skip,Sf )
Figure 8: Semantics of RSFOR (simplified selected rules).
12
6 Meta theory
In this section we will make more precise the connection between concrete and symbolic languages. In order to
do this, we need to reason about ground substitutions turning object containing symbolic values into concrete
objects. Given a command c or an expression e in SFOR (or in RSFOR) and a ground substitution σ ∈ Σ we
write σ(c) (and σ(e)) for the application of σ to c (and e). We can also apply a substitution to a unary symbolic
memory:
Definition 2. Given a ground substitution σ ∈ Σ we define its application to a unary symbolic memory as
σ(M) = λm.


σ(M(m)) if M(m) ∈ Symval
σ(π1(M(m))) if M(m) ∈ Symval×Vs
M(m) otherwise
where m ranges over Var ∪Arrvar.
We have a similar definition for relational symbolic memories which we omit here. From now on, we consider
only substitutions σ which respect the type of the program variables and array names appearing in a symbolic
expression or command. That is, given an expressing e (or command c) we consider substitutions σ for which
σ(e) (σ(c)) is an expression (command) in FOR (RFOR) whenever e (c) is an expression (command) in SFOR
(RSFOR). We also want to consider only substitutions mapping symbolic values to objects of their type. This
is characterized by the following definition.
Definition 3. We say that a ground substitution σ ∈ Σ validates a configuration (M, c,S) and we write
σ |= (M, c,S) iff σ |= S, ∀a ∈ Arrvar.M(a) = (X, v) ⇒ σ(X) ∈ {1, . . . , σ(v)} → Z, ∀x ∈ Var.M(x) = X ⇒
σ(X) ∈ Z, and σ respects the type of array names and program variables in c.
We also consider the natural partial order, over Σ given by the relation {(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ2 | ∀X ∈ dom(σ1).σ1(X) =
σ2(X)} .
6.1 Coverage
We now want to formalize the idea that a run of the set semantics can capture (cover) many concrete runs. To
do this we formalize what a final configuration (F ) of the ⇒ semantics (Figure 9) is.
Definition 4. A unary (or relational) configuration s is final, and we write Final(s), when s = (M, skip,S).
A set of configurations F is final, denoted Final(F ), if and only if forall s ∈ F .Final(s).
The following lemma states that any concrete execution can be covered by a symbolic path. This symbolic
path will have a satisfiable set of constraints which will make it possible to map back symbolic final configurations
to the concrete final configuration of the concrete path.
Lemma 2. If F ⇒∗ F ′, (M1, c1,S1) ∈ F , and σ1 |= (M1, c1,S1) then ∃kc1 , ∃(M2, c2,S2) ∈ F
′, ∃σ2 ∈ Σ such
that (σ1(M1), c1)
F−→
kc1 (σ2(M2), c2) (or (σ1(M1), c1)
RF−→
kc1 (σ2(M2), c2)), σ2  (M2, c2,S2), and σ1  σ2.
6.2 Proving and soundness
In symbolic execution we want to execute symbolically a program in order to reason about multiple concrete
executions. In order to do this we need to specify an initial memory from which the symbolic execution can
start. Without loss of generality we choose as initial memory the most abstract. This leads to the following
definition:
Definition 5. Let Φ be a unary assertion, and c a command in FOR. Define the following symbolic memory:
MemΦ,c ≡ λn ∈ VarOf (Φ) ∪VarOf (c).
{
X, if n ∈ Var
(X,L), if n ∈ Arrvar
where all the variables X,L are meant to be distinct and fresh, and the function VarOf (·) returns the set of
program variables and array names appearing in the argument.
The previous definition can be easily extended to relational memories, assertions, and commands. As
we already discussed, we are interested in using RelSym for proving valid specifications of programs. If we
want to prove that a triple {Φ}c{Ψ} is valid, we can execute symbolically c starting from an initial symbolic
configuration which satisfies the precondition Φ. If we reach only final configurations whose set of constraints
imply the postcondition Ψ, then the triple is valid. Formally:
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Definition 6. Let c be a command in FOR (or RFOR) and Φ and Ψ unary (or relational) assertions. We say
that c symbolically proves Ψ from Φ, and we write c : Φ =⇒ Ψ iff there exists F such that
• {(MemΦ,c, c, {JΦKMemΦ,c})} ⇒
∗
set
F
• Final(F )
• ∀(M, skip,S) ∈ F . |= S =⇒ JΨKM
It now makes sense to formulate the following soundness theorem:
Theorem 1 (Soundness of verification). Let Φ and Ψ be unary (or relational) assertions and let c be a command
in FOR (or RFOR). Then, if c : Φ =⇒ Ψ then  {Φ}c{Ψ}.
Proof. By structural induction on c, using Lemma 2.
6.3 Finding counterexamples: strength of invariants and soundness
We now want to formalize the fact that we can use RelSym for finding counterexamples. Let us consider
a program c, a precondition Φ and a postcondition Ψ. If starting to evaluate c from an initial symbolic
configuration and a set of constraints that satisfy the precondition Φ, we arrive in a final configuration whose
set of constraint is consistent with the negation of the postcondition Ψ (interpreted in the memory of the final
configuration), then we know that the post-condition does not hold. This argument motivates the following
definition.
Definition 7. Let c be a command in FOR (or RFOR) and Φ,Ψ unary (or relational) assertions. We say that,
c symbolically disproves Ψ from Φ and we write c : Φ 6=⇒ Ψ if and only if exists F such that
• {(MemΦ,c, c, {JΦKMemΦ,c})} ⇒
∗
set
F
• ∃(M, skip,S) ∈ F .SAT(S ∪ {J¬ΨKM})
A counterexample to the validity of a unary triple {Φ}c{Ψ} consists of a pair of concrete memoriesM1,M2
and I ∈ Intlog such that M1 I Φ and (M1, c) F−→∗(M2, skip) but M2 2I Ψ.
We would like to be able to extract, from an execution showing c : Φ 6=⇒ Ψ, a counterexample for {Φ}c{Ψ}.
Unfortunately, this cannot always be done.
Indeed because in presence of loops, invariants might just approximate the state after the loop has termi-
nated. That is the invariants might not specify precisely enough the state after the loop body has been executed
n times for arbitrary n. For instance: {z = 0 ∧ x > 0}for (i in 1:x) dotrue z←z + 1{false} is obviously an
invalid triple but the invariant does not say much about the value of z after the loop has been executed x times.
The invariant Is ≡ z = i would instead do the job, specifying exactly the final state. When invariants have this
property we say they are strong. With Definition 8 we capture the notion of strength of an invariant.
Definition 8. Given a command c ≡ for (x in e1:e2) doI cb in FOR (or in RFOR), we say that the invariant
I is strong iff ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ, if σ1 |= (Mf , skip,Sf ), σ2 |= (Mf , skip,Sf ), and σ1(M) =R σ2(M) then
σ1(Mf ) =U σ2(Mf ).
Where R =
(
(Var∪Arrvar)\U
)
∪{x}, U = Upd(cb) (or U = Updr(cb)), andM,Mf ,Sf are respectively
the memory right before the execution of the for-loop, and the memory and the set of constraints after the
application of the rule s-for-inv (or r-s-for-inv).
The following theorem allows to avoid false positives in interactive refutation.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of counterexample finding). Let Φ,Ψ be unary (or relational) assertions and c a
command in FOR (or RFOR). Then, if c : Φ 6=⇒ Ψ and all the invariants in c (if any) are strong then
6 {Φ}c{Ψ}.
Theorem 2 is a soundness result for counterexample finding which implies (relative) completeness of the
proving system w.r.t to the semantics of FOR (and RFOR). Indeed, provided the program c is annotated with
strong enough invariants, if RelSym cannot derive c : Φ 6=⇒ Ψ then it has to be the case that  {Φ}c{Ψ}. The
completeness just mentioned concerns the proving system and has nothing to do with the semantic completeness
of RFOR w.r.t to FOR which has been already ruled out in Section 4.4.
7 Implementation
RelSym has been implemented in OCaml 4.06 in about 4k LOC. The queries on satisfiability of set of con-
straints are discharged using the SMT solver Z3 De Moura and Bjørner (2008). The implementation is not fully
optimized.
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7.1 Checking the semantic judgment
Rules s-for-inv and r-s-for-inv, include among the premises a Hoare triple validity judgment, which ensures
that the assertion provided is an inductive invariant of the loop. By using semantic validity we allow other
potential implementations to use different analysis techniques for the verification of that triple, e.g., a sound
Hoare logic for FOR (or RFOR). Since we want RelSym to be a self-contained tool, in the implementation we prove
this judgment by recursively calling RelSym. In particular, while executing the rule s-for-inv (or r-s-for-inv)
on the command for (x in e1:e2) doI c we use recursively RelSym to prove  {I∧e1 ≤ x∧x ≤ e2}c{I[x+1/x]},
by checking that indeed c : I ∧ e1 ≤ x ∧ x ≤ e2 =⇒ I[x + 1/x]. This can also help in practice in finding the
right invariant by giving the user prompt feedback on why the assertion used at the moment is not an inductive
invariant.
7.2 Checking the strength of the invariant
If we want to use RelSym for finding counterexamples to specifications, we might need to check that the invariant
is strong as in Definition (8), so that by Theorem 2 we can be sure that the ground substitution provided (if
any) by the SMT is indeed a counterexample. In particular, this ensures that, if the SMT returns a σ such that
σ |= Sf ∪ {¬JΨKMf }, then indeed:
• σ(MemΦ,c)  Φ
• (σ(MemΦ,c), σ(c)) F−→∗(σ(Mf ), skip)
(or (σ1(M1), c1)
RF−→
∗
(σ2(M2), c2)),
• σ(Mf )  ¬Ψ
A way to check this property is to check for unsatisfiability the following set of constraints:
Sf ∪ {JI[v2 + 1/x]K
F
Mf
} ∪ {
∨
{X∈F}
X 6= X ′}
where: F is the set of fresh symbols generated during the execution of the rule s-for-inv (or r-s-for-inv), and
JI[v2 + 1/x]K
F
Mf
is the result of taking the invariant where x has been substituted with v2 + 1, interpreted as a
constraint through Mf , with all the symbols in F substituted with their primed versions. If it is not the case
that SAT(Sf ∪{JI[v2+1/x]K
F
Mf
}∪{
∨
{X∈F}X 6= X
′}) then there is only a possible way to satisfy Sf once the
symbols generated before the loop have been fixed, that is given a ground substitution σ for which σ  S ′′ then
there is only one possible σ′ such that σ  σ′ and σ′  Sf . This implies the strength of the invariant I.
8 Experimental results
We compared our relational symbolic semantics with other techniques used to prove or finding counterexamples
to relational properties. In particular with naive self-composition, simple product programs and the product
programs construction of Eilers et al. (2018). Since our implementation does not use any heuristics to try
to improve efficiency it makes sense to compare it with vanilla versions of these techniques. Also, notice that
product programs and self-composition can be easily embedded in our framework by just executing self-composed
programs and product programs in SFOR, that is by just using unary symbolic semantics. In this section we can
see some experimental results that show that relational symbolic execution is comparable in terms of execution
time, calls to the solver, and number of steps with respect to self-composition and product programs. The
results in Table (1) are about proving relational properties, while in Table (2) the results are about finding
counterexamples to relational properties. Some of the examples are taken from standard literature (sometimes
adapting them to our language). In the table an R (Relational) means that relational symbolic execution
was used, while U denotes that the self composed program was analyzed with unary symbolic semantics, a P
denotes a product program symbolically executed with unary semantics. Because of space reasons we only show
information which showed discernible differences in resource usage. An ↑ denotes that the symbolic execution
had to be terminated because it was running for too long, while an ✗ means that the SMT solver was not able
to discharge a query and so the result is unknown. Finally, a ? denotes absence of information, necessary when
RelSym ran out of time limits. The results regarding execution time are an average over 50 runs executed on
an Intel CPU, 2.80GHz with 16 GB of RAM memory.
The examples concern properties such as non-interference, e.g., n-inter. example and inter. example series,
ni-array example, or execution time independence e.g., Antonopoulos et al. (2017), or continuity e.g., sum-k-
lip-cont, or sort-k-lip-cont. On this benchmark overall relational symbolic execution performs better with
respect to standard unary self composition and comparably to product programs, in terms of execution time.
Besides execution times (unary and relational semantics) we can consider as measures also other information
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Example R/U/P #BS #SS #SMT #S tm (s)
Darvas R 8 5 3 2 0.39
Darvas U 15 18 5 3 0.04
Costanzo R 30032 42315 10921 4096 139
Costanzo U ? ? ? ? ↑
Antonopoulos R 68 101 20 10 0.15
Antonopoulos U 70 94 22 10 0.16
Terauchi[1] R 34 63 24 4 0.22
Terauchi[1] P 309 2472 179 9 1.49
Terauchi[1] U 46 141 22 4 0.22
Terauchi[2] R 55 91 34 9 0.36
Terauchi[2] U 31 155 10 3 ✗
n-inter. example 1 R 5 4 1 1 0.01
n-inter. example 1 P 33 56 26 4 0.01
n-inter. example 1 U 9 16 1 1 0.01
n-inter. example 2 R 5 4 1 1 0.01
n-inter. example 2 U 9 16 1 1 0.01
n-inter. example 3 R 7 9 1 1 0.01
n-inter. example 3 P 30 87 24 2 0.16
n-inter. example 3 U 13 36 1 1 0.02
n-inter. example 4 R 14 13 8 4 0.08
n-inter. example 4 P 51 109 35 9 0.2
n-inter. example 4 U 16 14 10 4 0.1
sum-k-lip-cont R 8 5 3 2 0.04
sum-k-lip-cont U 8 11 3 2 ✗
sort-k-lip-cont U 55 72 23 12 0.12
sort-k-lip-cont R 31 45 12 6 0.11
sort-k-lip-cont P 50 66 15 12 0.12
Table 1: Experimental results of proving relational properties. Where Darvas stands for Darvas et al. (2005),
Costanzo stands for Costanzo and Shao (2014), Antonopoulos stands for Antonopoulos et al. (2017), Terauchi
stands for Terauchi and Aiken (2005)
Example R/P/U #BS #SS #SMT #S tm (s)
ni-array R 291 380 132 37 1.08
ni-array U 342 674 90 16 0.7
Eilers et al. (2018) R 9 7 3 2 0.03
Eilers et al. (2018) U 13 25 1 1 0.01
inter. example1 R 3 1 1 1 0.01
inter. example1 P 13 10 10 4 0.08
inter. example1 U 21 33 5 3 0.04
inter. example2 R 3 1 1 1 0.01
inter. example2 P 13 10 10 4 0.07
inter. example2 U 5 4 1 1 0.02
inter-password R 485 714 169 64 1.40
inter-password U 703 960 190 64 1.78
Table 2: Experimental results for finding counterexamples relational properties.
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such as the number of steps of the semantics (small-step #SS, big-steps #BS) performed, calls to the solver
(#SMT) and number of final states reached (#S). Using these metrics shows more clearly how a relational
approach can, at times, outperform other approaches for the verification or interactive refutation of relational
properties. Eilers et al. (2018) construction for product programs introduces new variables and new branching
instructions. This is the main reasons why the number of SMT calls increases. More generally: consider the base
product program construction in Butler and Schulte (2011) and the number of basic instructions performed (e.g.
assignments) as a measure: commands are duplicated even when it doesn’t help. Product self-composition is a
generic syntactic technique. E.g.: take c ≡ p←p+1, and suppose we want to show that:  {p1 = p2}c{p1 = p2}.
Under product programs we could reduce the problem to verifying:  {p1 = p2}c1 × c2{p1 = p2} that is
 {p1 = p2}p1←p1 + 1; p2←p2 + 1{p1 = p2}. In the unary symbolic execution of the product program
necessarily two assignments will be performed. While executing relationally p←p + 1 might only execute one
assignment.
This evaluation shows that although we have trade-offs between the different techniques and none of them
is always better, in several situations relational symbolic execution brings clear improvements.
9 Related Works
The works most closely related to ours are the ones that have used symbolic execution for relational properties.
Milushev et al. (2012) use symbolic execution to check non-interference by means of an analysis based on a
type directed transformation of the program first presented in Terauchi and Aiken (2005). The analysis targets
programs written in a subset of C which includes procedures calls, and dynamically allocated data structures
modeled through a heap. A main difference with our work is that they focus only on non-interference while we
focus on arbitrary relational properties. Additionally, they use self-composition while we focus on the design of
a formal relational semantics. Finally, they use a generic approach based on heaps, instead, we focus on arrays
as concrete data structures and we leverage their properties in the design of our semantics.
In Person et al. (2008) symbolic execution is used to check differences between program versions. The
property they analyze, although relational can be easily described with two separate execution of the two
programs. Indeed, in their work symbolic execution is used separately for the two programs.
Relational properties have also been studied through many other techniques. We already mentioned different
works that reduce the verification of relational properties to the one of properties through self-composition Barthe et al.
(2004); Terauchi and Aiken (2005) and product programs Butler and Schulte (2011); Asada et al. (2017); Eilers et al.
(2018). Several works have studied relational versions of Hoare logics. For example, Benton Benton (2004) stud-
ies relational Hoare logics for noninterference and program equivalence, and Barthe et al. Barthe et al. (2012,
2014b) study relational Hoare logics for relational probabilistic properties, such as differential privacy. Their
work is based on a denotational semantics based on couplings and probabilistic liftings, while ours is operational
in nature. Other works such as Banerjee et al. (2016) have focused on a relational Hoare logics with frame rules
to deal with heap based semantics, and on situations where keeping the traces not aligned might be beneficial
in the same spirit of dissonant loop rules introduced in Beringer (2011). Other works instead tried to maximize
the amount of synchronicity between the two runs Pick et al. (2018). Several works have studied type systems
for the verification of different relational properties, some examples are noninterference Volpano et al. (1996);
Pottier and Simonet (2003); Nanevski et al. (2013), security of cryptographic implementations Barthe et al.
(2014a), differential privacy and mechanism design Barthe et al. (2015), and relational cost C¸ic¸ek et al. (2017)
These approaches are quite different from ours. For instance C¸ic¸ek et al. (2017) focuses on functional programs,
and uses a type discipline which requires a lot of domain expertise. Other works have applied abstract interpre-
tation techniques to noninterference Giacobazzi and Mastroeni (2004); Feret (2001); Assaf et al. (2017). While
symbolic execution and abstract interpretations share several similarities, the techniques that the approaches
rely on are quite different. In Austin and Flanagan (2012) authors introduce faceted values, that resemble our
paired values. They do this to simulate simultaneous runs of the same program on different security levels,
in order to provide information flow security with a dynamic approach as opposed to a static one as we do
in this work. Cartesian Hoare Logic Sousa and Dillig (2016) and its quantitative extension Chen et al. (2017)
can be used for reasoning about generic k-safety properties, and their quantitative analogous. The language
that Cartesian Hoare Logic considers includes arrays and while loops with breaks. The class of properties they
consider goes beyond relational properties and their analysis is automated. The main difference between their
approach and ours is that we perform symbolic execution which can also be used to finding bugs while they only
focus, at least on the theoretical part, on proving correctness via Hoare Logic. Kwon et al. Kwon et al. (2017)
recently proposed a program analysis for checking information flow policies over streams based on a technique
for synthesizing relational invariants. This analysis is not based on symbolic execution, but we plan to explore
if their algorithm for synthesizing relational invariants can be used in our setting.
Similar to our work their semantics is based on couplings and the probabilistic lifting of relations. Close to
our work is also Albarghouthi and Hsu (2018) where a proof technique, casting differential privacy proofs as a
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strategy in a game encoded as a set of constraints, is presented. In that work authors focus again in finding
proof and not in finding counter examples to differential privacy.
10 Conclusions
In this work we presented RelSym, a foundational framework for relational symbolic execution. The framework
supports interactive refutation as well as proving of relational properties for a language with arrays and loops.
We provided some meta theoretical results about symbolic execution for its use with respect to proving validity
of triples and disproving them and we provided necessary conditions for which disproving is actually sound. We
have shown the flexibility of this approach by analyzing examples for a range of different relational properties. We
compared the analysis of this properties using different approaches, i.e., self-composition, product programs and
relational approach. We have implemented the tool and in the future we plan to address more complex features
like functions, promises and closures, as well as exploring the generation of relational loop invariants Qin et al.
(2013); Chen et al. (2011); Hoder et al. (2011); Khurshid et al. (2003); Kwon et al. (2017), limiting in this way
the need for annotations provided by the user.
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